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DO TOURNAMENTS  HAVE INCENTIVE EFFECTS? 
ABSTRACT 
Much attention has been devoted to studying models  of tournaments  or 
situations in which an individual's  payment depends only on his output or 
rank,  relative to other canpetitors. Such models are of more than 
academic Interest  as they may well describe the canpensation  structures 
applicable  to many corporate  executives  and professors,  to sales  people 
whose bonuses depend  on their relative  outputs, and to the more obvious 
example  of professional sports tournaments. Academic interest  derives 
fran the fact that under certain sets of assumptions  tournaments  have 
desirable  normative properties  because  of the  incentive  structures  they 
provide. 
Our paper  uses nonexperlmental  data to test  if tournaments  actually 
elicit  desired effort responses.  We focus  on golf tournaments  because 
information  on the  incentive  structure (prize  distribution)  and measures 
of individual  output (players' scores)  are both available.  Under suitable 
assumptions,  players' scores can be related to players' effort  and 
implications  for both players' overall  tournament  scores and their scores 
on the  last round of a tournament  drawn.  In addition,  data are available 
to control  for factors other than the  Incentive  structure that  should 
affect output;  these factors include  player quality,  quality of the  rest 
of the field,  difficulty  of the course, and weather conditions. 
The data used in our analyses cane  fran the  1985  Golf Diqest  Almanac, 
the Official 1985PGA  Tour Media Guide, and the  1984  PGA Tour Player 
Record.  We find strong support for the proposition that the level  and 
structure  of prizes in PGA tournaments  influence  players'  performance. 
Ronald  G.  Ehrenberg  Michael  L. Bognanno 
NYSSILR  NYSSILR 
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Ithaca,  NY  14851-0952  Ithaca,  NY  14851-0952 I.  Introduction 
In recent  years economists  have devoted considerable  attention to the 
normative properties  of alternative  compensation  arrangements.  Among the 
arrangements discussed  have been deferred  payment schemes, the payment of 
efficiency  wages, piece-rates  and the use of tournaments  or payment by 
relative output.1  The optimality  properties  of the various arrangements 
in certain states  of the world (e.g., relating to monitoring costs, 
recruitment  costs,  turnover costs,  asymmetric  information,  or random 
productivity  shocks)  derives from the postulated  incentive  effects that 
each arrangement  is thought to have.  Yet surprisingly  there  has been very 
little  effort made to test whether these  incentive  effects actually exist 
jj  lead to improved individual  or firm  performance.2 
Our work addresses  models of tournaments,  or situations  in which an 
individual's  payment depends only on his output  or rank relative to other 
competitors.  Such  models are of more than academic interest  as they  may 
well describe the compensation  structures  applicable  to many corporate 
executives,  to professors (who  can been thought of as being involved in 
promotion tournaments),  to sales people (whose bonuses often  depend on 
their  relative outputs),  and to the more  obvious example of professional 
sports tournaments.  Academic interest  derives from the fact that,  under 
certain sets of assumptions, tournaments  have desirable  normative 
properties  because of the incentive  structures  they provide. 
Very few attempts  have been made to test if tournaments  actually 
elicit  desired effort  responses.  One experimental study of rank-order 
tournaments  that  used 225 paid undergraduate  student volunteers as 
subjects did find  mixed support for the theory,  although disadvantaged 
1 2 
(high  cost of effort)  subjects  provided more effort than the theory 
predicted.3  The lack  of nonexperimental  studies  of tournaments  is 
probably due to the difficulty  of measuring  both individuals'  effort 
levels  and the incentive  structures  competitors  face in many 
circumstances. 
To test in a nonexperimental  setting whether tournaments  do have 
incentive  effects,  we focus  on golf tournaments  because information  on the 
incentive structure (prize  distribution)  and measures of individual  output 
(players'  scores) are both available.  Under suitable assumptions, 
players' scores  can be related to players' effort and implications  for 
scores  drawn.  In addition,  data are available to control for factors 
other than the incentive  structure that should  affect output;  these 
factors  include  player quality, quality of the rest of the field, 
difficulty  of the course, and weather conditions.  Implications  can be 
drawn  both for how well a player will perform during an entire tournament 
and how well he will perform on the last (fourth)  round  contingent, 
ceteria  paribus, on his rank in the tournament  after the  third  round. 
The next section sketches some simple  two-person  tournament  models 
that provide the basis for our econometric  work.  Our empirical analyses 
make use of data from the 1984 Men's Professional  Golf Association (PGA) 
Tour and section  III discusses  key institutional  characteristics  of the 
PGA Tour and specific  hypotheses to be tested.  Section IV describes the 
sources of the data used in our analyses and our econometric  findings. 
Finally, section V presents some concluding  remarks and discusses the 
implications  of our findings for future  research. 3 
II.  Some Models  of Tournaments  and Their Implications 
The  simple  two-contestant  tournament  models that follow are 
extensions of those  found in Lazear  and Rosen (1981).  While others,  for 
example Green and Stokey (1983),  have studied  n  person tournaments  and 
derived normative implications  about them,  the simpler two-person 
tournament  captures  the essence of the incentive  problem.  If one wishes, 
one can interpret  the two-person tournament  as a competitor  competing 
against a representative  of "the rest  of the field". 
Consider first  the case of homogeneous  competitors.  Individual  j's 
output in tournament  i,  qjj 
is given  by 
(1)  qjj 
—  Uji + Eji +  Si  j  — a,b  I  —  l,2...n. 
There are two individuals  (a and b) and  n  tournaments. Here  Uji 
is individual  j's  level of effort/concentration  in tournament  i,  Ejj 
is a pure random  or luck component  which is drawn from a known symmetric 
distribution that is further assumed to be normal  with mean zero and 
variance  and  &  Is a tournament  specific effect  on output.  The 
latter is due to factors like the difficulty  of the course and the 
adversity of weather conditions  and,  for simplicity,  is assumed to affect 
all players in tournament  equally.  Increases  in effort are translated 
into  higher outputs which, in the context of a golf tournament,  means 
lower scores. 
Of course,  one may argue that our empirical  focus is on professional 
golfers and that  professionals always  play as hard as they can.4  What 
this criticism  ignores, however, is how difficult it is even for 4 
professionals to maintain their concentration  levels  over tournaments  that 
typically last four days  per week and that involve two to three  hours of 
physical effort per day.  Furthermore,  playing on the tour involves  weekly 
travel  and a "hotel  lifestyle".  At the very least,  one might expect 
fatigue to aet in on the latter  days of a tournament  and players' ability 
to maintain their  concentration  to diminiah  at these  times.  To capture 
this,  we assume that each individual  faces a "cost  of effort/ 
concentration" function (c(u)),  with the marginal cost of effort being 
positive and increasing (c'(u) > 0,  c"(u)  > 0). 
Suppose that the prize for winning tournament  i is wli,  while the 
prize for the loser is w2j.  Given these assumptions,  an individual's 
expected utility is given  by, 
(2)  p[w1-c(u)]  + (l-p)[w2-c(u)]  — pw + (1-p)w2 
-  c(u) 
where  p  is an individual's  probability  of winning. 
Now individual  a's probability  of winning tournament  i  is given  by 
(3)  Pa — prob(q5 > qbi)  — prob (uai-ubi  > biaP6i8i) 
— prob(ua-ub > 9) —  G(ua-ub). 
Here  9  —  -  €a,  9  is distributed  as  g(9),  G(9)  is the cumulative 
distribution function of  9  and -- if we assume  Eai  and  6bi  are 
independent  and identically  distributed  - -  E(9) — 0  and  E(9)2 — 22. 
Under these assumptions,  9  is also normally diatributed  and hence  g(9) 
— g(-9)  and  g'(9) — -g'(-9)  for all 9 ' 0. 
Each player chooses his effort  level to maximize expected utility, 
which leads (assuming  interior  solutions) to first and second order 5 
conditions respectively  of the form 
(4)  (wl-w2)(p/uj) 
- c'(uj) 
— 0  j — a,b 
(w1-w2)(2p/u)  cfl(uj) 
< 0 
If one assumes a Nash-Cournot equilibrium, that is that each player 
optimizes against his opponent assuming that the opponent has chosen his 
optimal strategy, one obtains 
(5)  Pa/t1a  — C(uaub)/ua  — g(u-u) 
— G(ubua)/ub — g(u-u5). 
Substituting (5) into the first-order  conditions in (4) yields reaction 
functions for the two players. 
(6)  (w-w)g(u-u) 
— c'(u5) 
(w-w)g(u-ug)  — c'(ub). 
Since  g(e)  — g(-9),  C'(Ua)  must equal  c'(ub),  which in turn 
implies  ua — u.  Both players exert the  same effort level and have an 
ex ante probability  of winning of one-half.  Moreover, (6) reduces to 
(7)  (w-w)g(O) 
— c'(u) 
and it is straightforward  to show that 
(8)  u/(wl-w2)  — (g(0)/c"(u)) >  0 
That is,  increasing the prize differential for winning should lead to 
increased player effort and thus,  ceteris paribus, to lower scores. 
Indeed, returning to (1),  we can rewrite it as 6 
(9)  qjj 
— uji(wli-w2i) 
+  +  6j. 
In  the homogeneous  contestant  model scores should depend  only on the prize 
differential for winning and on tournament  specific factors (the weather 
and course difficulty). 
Most tournaments,  of course,  do not have homogeneous  contestants and 
it is possible to introduce  heterogeneity into  the model in at least three 
ways.  First,  one can assume that the marginal return to effort is greater 
for one contestant;  instead of (1) one would then have 
(10)  qai — uai +  Eai  + 6i'  qbi — nuj + Ebj  + 
where  if  n  is greater than one,  b  is the better  player.  Second, one 
can assume that the players differ  not in the return  to effort but rather 
in their cost  of effort function;  in this case the cost of effort 
functions would  become 
(11)  ca(u)  — c(u),  Cb(U)  — yc(u)  0 < y < 1 
where, since  y  is less than one,  b  can achieve any effort level at a 
lower cost than  a  and hence again  b  is a better player.  Finally, one 
could assume  that the marginal return  to effort  and marginal cost of 
effort functions  were identical,  but that  one player  had an absolute 
advantage over the other  player.  That is 
(12)  qj  — uaj + Eai  # i'  bi  Ubj +  + Ebi  + 
If  is greater than 0,  b  is the better player in the sense that, 
ceteris paribus,  b  will have greater output (a lower score) than  a  if 
both exert the same level  of effort. 7 
It is straightforward  to substitute  these  alternative  assumptions 
about  heterogeneity into the model and to obtain comparative  static 
results.  For brevity,  we omit the details  here and simply summarize  two 
key implications.5  First,  all three  modifications  still lead to the 
result that a greater prize differential  for winning should lead to more 
effort and thus  lower scores.  Second,  all three suggest that a player's 
effort,  and hence output, will depend  both on his own ability (A0) 
and 
the ability of his competitor (Aj).  Hence,  the output of individual  j 
in tournament  i  can be written as 
(13) ji 
— Ujj((W1jW2i)  Ajo,Ajc) 
+ Ejj 
+ 6j. 
That is,  in the heterogeneous contestant  model,  a player's score should 
depend upon the prize differential  for winning,  measures of his and his 
opponent's ability, and tournament  specific factors,  such as the weather 
and course difficulty. 
III.  The  1984  Men's Professional  Golf Tour:  Institutional Characteristics 
and Hypotheses to be Tested 
The typical golf tournament  is a four round tournament.  Half the 
field is "cut" at the end of the second  round,  two additional rounds  are 
played,  and then prizes awarded on the basis of the players' ranks  after 
the  final  round.  Of the 45 tournaments  on the 1984 Men's Professional 
Golf Association  Tour,  40 were of this type,  and data from them are used 
in our analyses. 
Across these tournaments  the structure  of prize money by rank  was 
virtually identical,  although the jj  of prize  money varies across 
tournaments.6  Figure 1 summarizes this structure.  A  key element of  the 8 
prize structure  is that the marginal return  from improving  one's 
performance  by one rank (or by not seeing  one's  performance  decline by one 
rank)  was much higher for people  who were close to the  leaders  after  three 
rounds than it was for people  who were far from the  leaders.  For example, 
the marginal prize received from finishing  second instead of third was 4.0 
percent of the total tournament  prize money,  while the marginal prize 
received from finishing  twenty-second  instead of twenty-third  was 0.1 
percent of the total tournament  prize  money.7 
This structure  of prizes,  coupled  with variations in the level  of 
prizes  across tournaments  suggests two types  of tests of the theories 
sketched in the preceding section.  First,  since the structure of prizes 
is constant across tournaments,  the prize  differential for  "winning" 
depends only on the level of total  prize money.  Thus,  one can focus  on a 
tournament  as a whole and ask,  other things  equal, if higher total prize 
money leads to lower scores.  Second,  one can focus only on the  last  round 
of a tournament  and ask,  other things equal, if a player's performance  on 
the last round depends on the marginal return to effort  he faces.  The 
latter  will depend in turn on the total  prize money in the  tournament,  his 
rank after the third round, and  how many players are tightly  bunched 
around  him after three rounds.  Both types  of analyses are reported in the 
next section. 
Before turning to the empirical  results,  however, one institutional 
complication must be discussed.  Not every pro golfer who wanted to enter 
any given PCA tournament  in 1984 could.  Rather, a system of exemptions 
and priorities existed.  At the risk of simplifying  a very complex  system, 
the system  worked as follows:8 9 
(i)  Any golfer  who had won a major  tournament  since 1975 or any PCA 
Tour tournament  in 1983 could enter  any tournament  he wanted in 
both 1984  1985. 
(ii)  Any golfer  who failed  to qualify  under (i) and had won a major 
tournament  in 1975 or any PGA Tour tournament  in 1982 could 
enter any tournament  he wanted  in 1984  but had no promise of 
entry for tournaments  in 1985. 
(iii)  If all positions in a 1984 tournament  were not filled  by 
individuals  from categories  (i) and (ii),  any golfer  who 
finished  among the top 125 money winners on the 1983 PGA Tour 
could enter the tournament. 
(iv)  Any remaining  vacancies in a tournament  were filled  using other 
criteria (e.g.,  the sponsor got to choose a number of players, 
lower  ranked  players on the 1983 tour,  leaders from the PGA Tour 
Qualifying  Tournament). 
As we shall show,  this system  of exemptions  and priorities  helps to 
explain which players entered  which 1984  PCA Tour tournaments; this is 
important  because analyses that use data  on the scores  of entrants to 
tournaments  will be subject to potential  selectivity  biases.  In addition, 
individuals in categories (ii),  (iii), and (iv) had to be very concerned 
about their total tour earnings in l984.  For unless they won a PGA Tour 
tournament  during the year,  they had to finish in the  top 125 money 
winners during the year in order to be assured  of virtual automatic entry 
if they desired to PGA Tour tournaments  in 1985 (i.e.,  to be in category 
(iii)  in 1985).  In contrast,  no matter  what individuals  in category (i) 
accomplished during the 1984 tour,  they were assured the option of entry 
into any PGA Tour tournament  that they  wanted to enter in 1985. 
Suppose that the latter  group,  who we refer to henceforth as the 
exempt players, exhibited  effort levels  that  were sensitive to the level 
and structure  of prizes in a tournament.  Because the former group,  who we 
henceforth refer to as the nonexempt players,  had to worry about 
qualifying for the next year's tour,  the level and structure  of prize 10 
money in a tournament  may not be an accurate indicator  of their  marginal 
financial  return  to effort.  Rather, one would need to also  know how an 
increase in effort for one of them increased  both the probability  that  he 
would be classified  as an exempt  player in 1985 and his expected future 
earnings if  he was so classified.  As such,  even if the exempt  and 
nonexempt players'  marginal responses to financial returns  were equal, one 
might intuitively  "expect"  nonexempt  players' effort levels,  and hence 
scores, to be less sensitive  to tournament  specific  prize  variables.  The 
appendix presents a simple omitted  variables  model that indicates the 
precise (and restrictive)  conditions  under which this expectation  is 
theoretically  correct and we test to see  if responses differ  between the 
two groups in the next section.1° 
IV.  Empirical  Analyses 
Our empirical  analyses proceeds in stages.  First  we estimate final 
score  equations for players on the 1984  Men's PGA Tour.  Next,  we estimate 
score  after the  second  round equations.  Third, we estimate final round 
score  equations.  Finally,  we present some estimates for older  men who 
played on the 1984 PGA  Men's Senior  Tour. 
A)  Final Score  EQuations 
Data are available  in the 1985 Golf Digest Almanac (1984)  and the 
Official 1985 PGA Tour Media Guide (1985) for each 1984 Men's PGA 
Tournament on the score  by round,  final rank,  and prize money won for all 
players who entered and made the cut in each tournament)'  Data on each 
player's scoring average on all rounds  during the year, a measure of his 
"ability",  are available only for the top 160 money  winners during the 11 
year; consequently  the analyses reported  below are restricted to these 
iridividuals)2  Equations  were estimated (pooling  the data across 
individuals  and tournaments)  of the form 
(14)  sjj 
— a0 + ajTPRIZEj  + axj + 
a3yj 
+ a4zj + 
vjj 
Here  sjj  is the  final  score of individual j  in tournament  i. 
TPRIZE  is the total prize  money awarded in the tournament,  xj  is a 
vector of variables  to control for the difficulty  of the  tournament  course 
and weather conditions, j is a vector  of proxies for player  j's 
ability,  zj  is a vector of variables  to control  for the quality of other 
players in the field and  vjj  is a random  error  term.  If the theory of 
tournaments is correct,  higher prizes should  lead to lower scores,  hence 
estimates of  a1  should  be negative. 
The controls for other tournament  specific  factors are PAR, the par 
for the tournament  course;  DIST.  the total  course  yardage; RATING,  the 
PGA's  evaluation  of the playing difficulty  of the course as it was Set U 
for  the tournament (expressed  in  strokes);  and WAVE,  the average of three 
raters'  perceptions  of the number of days during  the tournament that the 
weather significantly  influenced  player  performance.  Player ability is 
proxied by SCOREAVE,  his scoring average on all rounds  played during the 
1984 tour;  and FCUT,  the fraction of tournaments  he entered in which he 
made the cut during  the 1984 tour.  Finally,  the quality of the other 
players in the field is proxied by FRACT,  the fraction  of all players in 
the tournament  who made the cut that were ranked in the top 160 of total 
prize winners during the 1984 tour and MPERAVE; a measure of the mean 12 
"performance average" on the 1984  tour of players in the tournament  who 
made the cut.13 
Estimates are reported in Table 1.  Separate analyses are presented 
for the entire sample, for the exempt  players, and for nonexempt 
players.14  A dummy variable for whether a tournament  is a "major" 
tournament (i.e.,  the U.S. Open,  the PGA or the Masters) is also 
included.'5  Winning a major tournament  typically  provides substantial 
opportunities for lucrative  endorsements,  hence the total price money 
variable understates the return  to winning these  tournaments. 
Turning to the results,  more difficult  courses, as measured by PAR, 
DIST, and RATING are seen to lead to higher scores.  Similarly,  each day 
of "bad" weather appear to raise  players' scores  by over 2 strokes.  As 
expected,  poorer players, as measured  by SCOREAVE, play  worse.  where 
significant, competing against  a better field,  as measured  by FRACT and 
MPERAVE, appears to lead to higher scores. 
Most striking, the coefficient  of TPRIZE is negative as anticipated. 
TPRIZE is measured in thousands  of dollars,  hence increasing  the total 
prize money by $100,000 is associated  with each player,  on average, 
scoring 1.1 strokes lower during  a tournament (col.  1).  The results of 
estimating an equation in which TPRIZE is interacted  with exempt status 
(col.  2) and of estimating  separate equations  for exempt (col.  1E)  and 
nonexempt players (col.  iN) suggest that the coefficient  of TPRIZE is 
slightly larger (in absolute  value) for exempt  players.  As noted in the 
previous section and the appendix,  this  may reflect either that exempt 
players effort  levels  more responsive  to financial  variables, or that 
the nonexempt  players TPRIZE coefficient  is biased towards zero because 13 
their  marginal return  to effort is also  based both on how doing  well in a 
tournament increases  their  probability  of being classified  as exempt in 
the next year and on their  expected increase  in the present  value of 
future income if so classified.  Finally,  other things  equal,  scores are 
lower in major tournaments  but significantly  so only for exempt  players 
(col.  1E),  Since these  players are the ones  with the  greatest  chance of 
winning and thus gaining  the endorsement  value, this result  seems 
sensible. 
Of course the results in Table 1 may be subject to two types  of 
selection  bias because the sample is restricted  to the subset of players 
who entered and made the cut in each tournament.  Because of this,  we may 
confound the effect of the total prize  variable on players' final scores 
with its effect on their  entering and making  the cut in a tournament.  To 
control for this possible  problem, requires one to have data on the 
players who entered each tournament  and failed to make the cut; 
fortunately the PGA was able to provide us this information,  as well as 
data on these players' scores  during the first two rounds  of the 
tournament.16 
To model separately  the decision to enter a tournament  and the 
probability of making the cut and then  to estimate a bivariate selection 
model is a difficult task.  Instead, we approximated  this process and 
estimated a univariate  probit  probability  of entering and making the Cut 
equation.17  Following the approach initially  suggested  by James Heckwan 
(1979)  estimates from this equation  were then  used to compute an estimate 
of the inverse  I'Iills ratio for each individual  and the latter  entered as 
an additional explanatory  variable in (14) to control for selectivity 14 
bias.  However,  when this augmented final  score  equation was reestimated, 
the coefficient  of the additional  variable  never proved  significant  nor 
did the TPRIZE  coefficients  differ from those  reported in Table 1.  Thus, 
the estimates in Table 1 do not appear to be subject to selection bias. 
B)  Score  After Second  Round Equations 
Given the availability  of data on the score after two rounds for all 
individuals  who enter each tournament,  we can estimate how the level  of 
prize money influences  players' performance  in the early rounds  of a 
tournament.  Table 2 presents estimates  similar to those found in Table 1, 
save that the sample  is now all entrants in each tournament  (among  the top 
160 money winners in  the year) and the outcome  variable is now the 
player's score  after the second round,  prior to the cut's being made.  In 
addition, the weather variable now refers  to the weather on the first two 
days of the  tournament  and the field quality  variables to all entrants, 
rather than to those  who made the cut,  in each tournament. 
The most striking  finding is that the total  tournament  prize money 
does not appear  to influence  players' performance  during  the first two 
rounds.  Only for exempt  players in the specification  where exempt status 
is interacted  with the prize variable (col.  2),  is there any evidence of 
an effect and,  even for this group,  an increase in prize money of $100,000 
would be associated  with scores that  were only  0.1 strokes lower  per 
player after the first two rounds.  This finding is consistent  with the 
hypothesis offered earlier that a player's difficulty  of maintaining 
concentration  occurs  primarily in the  latter  rounds  of tournament  when 
fatigue is more likely to have set in. 15 
Of course,  the possibility still  exists  that the results in Table 2 
are subject to selection  bias because they are based on a sample of 
tournament  entrants; we may be confounding  the effect  of a tournament's 
prize level on the probability players  enter the  tournament,  with its 
effect on their scores.  To check for this,  Heckman's (1979),  two-step 
procedure  was once again employed. 
Table 3 presents the results of several  probit probability  of 
entering a tournament  equations that  we estimated.  In these equations, 
entry  probabilities are specified to be a function  of a player's exempt 
status (EXMPT),  his total  career earnings  prior to 1984 (PRCASH),  his age 
(ACE),  the chronological order of a tournament  during the year (TCODE)  and 
its  square,  whether the tournament is a major  tournament  (MAJ),  the 
tournaments  total prize money (TPRIZE),  and the player's scoring average 
on all  rounds  in which he played during  the 1984 tour (SCOEAVE),  or on all 
first and second  rounds in which  he played during  the  tour (SCORE12). 
Separate sets of coefficients are estimated  for exempt and nonexempt 
players; the former  are denoted in the table by an "A" before a variable 
name while the latter are denoted by a "B" in front  of the variable name. 
The results one observes in this table  are of interest in themselves. 
Exempt  players are more likely to enter  major tournaments  and tournaments 
with higher prize money and, as a result,  nonexempt  players (with lower 
priority) are  less likely to enter major and high prize money tournaments 
(although  the latter result is not significant).18 An income effect on 
labor supply is evident for exempt  players  as, ceteris paribus, the 
greater an exempt player's lifetime earnings,  the less likely  he is to 
enter a tournament.  The probability  a nonexempt  player  will enter a 16 
tournament declines  with age,  although  no such  pattern exists  for exempt 
players.  The poorer a player  is,  as measured by higher average scores 
during the year,  the more likely  he is to enter  a tournament.  Finally, 
the probability of entering tournaments  for both groups,  ceteris paribus, 
follows a "un shaped  pattern during the year and is lowest  during the hot 
summer  months.  This implies  that foreign  golfers who don't play regularly 
on the tour and individuals  in our category (iv),  both groups  which are 
in our sample,  are more likely  to enter tournaments  during this time. 
The estimates in Table 3 were then used to obtain estimates  of the 
inverse Mills ratio for each individual  entered in each tournament  and 
augmented versions of the score  after the second round equations  then 
estimated.  However, again the coefficients of the estimated inverse  Mills 
ratio never proved significant  and the estimated  coefficients  of the total 
prize variable were identical  to those found in Table 2.  Thus,  the 
conclusions that the level  of prize  money at best only marginally  affects 
the level of effort during  the first two rounds for exempt players and 
does not affect  the level  of effort  during that time for nonexempt  players 
appears to be valid. 
C)  Final Round Score  EQuation5 
Consider a golfer  playing in two tournaments  with the same total 
prize money.  Suppose  he scores  a 72 on each of the first three days of 
both tournaments  but, because of random  factors that influence  his 
opponents' performance,  he finds  himself in third place in the first 
tournament  but in twentieth  place in the second tournament.  Given the 
structure of PGA tournament  prizes (Figure  1), he faces, a greater marginal 
return to effort/concentration  in the first tournament,  should exert  more 17 
effort/concentration  there  and, on average,  should have a lower final 
round score in that tournament.  Put another way, we should  expect to 
observe, ceteris paribus, a positive  correlation  between a player's rank 
after the third round of tournaments  and his final round score. 
An initial test of this  hypothesis is found in Table 4 in which we 
present the result of estimating  final round score equations,  using data 
pooled across individuals  and tournaments.  A player's score  on the  final 
round of a tournament  is specified  to be a function of his scores  on the 
first  three days of the tournament (SCORE1,  SCORE2,  SCORE3),  measures of 
whether the weather adversely  affected players' performance  on the first 
three days (WAVE123)  and on the final  day of the tournament  (WAVE4),  the 
player's rank after the third round (SCR3RANK),  and the  total  tournament 
prize money (TPRIZE).  Given the weather, a player's scores  on the first 
three  days,  which are probably the best predictor of how well he is 
currently playing, should  be positively  associated with his score  on the 
final  day.  Given his scores  on the  first  three days,  the poorer the 
weather was on them,  the lower  his score  should be on the final  day. 
However, the poorer the weather on the final day,  ceteris paribus, the 
higher  his final day score should  be. 
A player's scores  on the first three  days of a tournament  are not 
exogenous,  but rather  depend (from  equation (14))  on the prize 
differential for winning, measures of his and his opponents  ability, and 
tournament  specific factors such as course  difficulty and the weather on 
those  days.  Similarly,  a player's rank after the third round is also not 
exogenous.  It depends upon his scores  and his opponents'  scores  on the 
first three  days;  both of which depend in turn on the factors  described 18 
above.  As such,  we traat SCORE1,  SCORE2,  SCORE3,  and SCR3RANX  as 
endoganous  and the estimates in Table 4 are obtained using an instrumental 
variable method.19 
Quite striking, as expected, Table  4 indicates  that tha higher the 
rank of a player (the poorer  his relative position)  after the third day of 
a tournament,  the higher his final  round score  will be (col.  lA,  3A). 
However, as in Table 1, this relationship  is found  only for exempt  players 
(col.  lE,  1N).2° 
Of course,  entering a player's rank after three rounds and total 
tournament  prize  money separately  only approximates  the marginal return to 
effort/concentration  that  he faces  if he improves s given number of ranks. 
Such a specification  also does  flQS  take into  account how closely his 
competitors  are  "bunched"  around  him.  To obtain  more precise measures of 
the relevant  marginal returns,  we defined six different  variables, these 
are all illustrated  in Figure  2. 
Referring to the figure,  suppose that the curve PP shows the 
relationship  between a player's final  rank in a tournament  and the prize 
money he will  be awarded.  Consider an individual  who after the  third 
round is at rank K.  If he remains at that rank,  he will be awarded the 
amount OA at the end of the tournament. 
The first three  marginal return  variables we compute ignore  how 
tightly bunched competitors  are around the player and are based on the 
return to improving  performance,  or of having it get worse, by one rank. 
DPRIZE3 is the estimated marginal increase in prize money if the 
individual's  rank at the end of the  tournament  was one better than  his 
current rank.  It is based on the slope of PP at K  and is given by AZ. 19 
UPRIZE3 is the actual  increase in prize money the  individual  would gain if 
he improved  his rank by one; this is given  by AC in the figure.  MIDPRIZ3 
assumes the individual  takes into account  the cost of losing one rank,  as 
well as the benefit from improving  one rank.  It is defined as the actual 
average absolute change in prize money if the rank at the end of the 
tournament  is either one  lower  or one higher than  R  and it is given in the 
figure  by the average of the lengths  of AC and AD. 
Presumably,  increased  effort/concentration  directly affects a 
player's score not his rank.  The effect  of increased  concentration  on 
rank then depends  upon the number of competitors  closely bunched around 
the player.  The next three  measures take this into account; they are the 
actual  increase in prize money the individual  would receive if he improved 
his scores  relative to his competitors  by one stroke (LES1PRIZ),  two 
strokes (LES2PRIZ),  or three  strokes (LES3PRIZ).  Assuming that 
improvements  of one,  two,  and three strokes  would cause the individual's 
rank to improve respectively  to S, T, and U in the figure,  these 
variables'  magnitudes in turn  would be given  by AE,  AF,  and AC. 
Each of these six variables  was computed for each individual  in each 
tournament.  Each variable in turn was substituted  for SCR3RA}X  and TPRIZE 
and equations similar to those reported  in Table 4 reestimated.  Because 
each of these  marginal return  to effort  variables depends upon a player's 
rank after the  third  round and the latter  is endogenous, instruments  were 
also used for each of these  variables.21 
Estimates  of the coefficients  of the marginal return to effort 
variables from these  equations are reported  in Table 5.  The pattern of 
results is remarkably  consistent  across  specifications.  The marginal 20 
prize variables do affect  players' scores on the final round,  but again 
only for exempt players. 
Table 6 presents descriptive  statistics  for each of the marginal 
prize variables.  Focusing on the exempt  sample,  one can use these  data 
and the estimates in Table 5 to get estimates  of the  influence  of these 
variables on players' performance.  For example, ceteris paribus, one can 
compute, for each variable, how much better  exempt players, whose  marginal 
prize is one standard deviation above  the mean marginal prize in the 
exempt sample,  will play by multiplying  the standard deviation in Table 6 
by the corresponding regression  coefficient  in Table 5.  For five  of the 
six marginal  prize variables,  the calculations  imply that such exempt 
players will score 1.5 to 2.0 strokes  lower on the final round of the 
tournament.  22 
D)  Averaae Score Per Round Equations  for the 1984 Senior PG& Tour 
The evidence presented  above is strongly  supportive of the notion 
that professional golfers' effort/concentration  level respond to the 
financial incentives  they face and that these response occur primarily in 
the last rounds of tournaments  when fatigue  is more likely to have set in 
and thus the difficulty of maintaining  concentration is harder. 
The PGA operates a separate  Senior  Tour for golfers age 50 and older. 
Given the players' ages,  it seems reasonable  to assume that fatigue  will 
be higher, as will be the difficulty  of maintaining  concentration,  on the 
senior tour.  Thus, one might expect to observe larger marginal responses 
to the reward structure  by these  players. 
Table 7 presents some results that are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Estimates are presented  of equations in which the averau 21 
round score of a senior  player in a tournament  is specified  to be a 
function of the prize  money in the tournament  (either total  prize money 
(TPRIZE) or winner's prize  money (WINPRIZ)),  the difficulty  of the course, 
as measured by its par (PAR)  and length  (DIST),  the player's ability as 
measured by his scoring average in all rounds  played during  the year 
(SCOREA),  and a measure of field  quality, the number of competitors  in the 
tournament  who finished  among the top 10 money winners on the senior tour 
in 1984 (TOP1O).23 Some tournaments  on the senior tour only lasted  three 
rounds and hence the number  of rounds  in the tournament  is added as an 
additional  explanatory  variable (ROUNDS).  The sample is confined to the 
top 25 money  winners during  the year on the tour and to 22 tournaments 
that had similar prize structures.24 
The results in Table 7 suggest that fatigue plays an important  role 
on the senior tour.  Ceteris  paribus, players' scores  are about  2 strokes 
per round  higher on 4 day tournaments  than they are on 3 day tournaments. 
Furthermore, one observes that  higher winners' prizes (col.  (1)) or total 
tournament  prizes (col.  (2)) both lead to lower scores  per round.25 
Indeed,  the results in column (2) suggest that an increase in the total 
prize money of $100000  would lead to scores that averaged .8 strokes 
lower per round.  Over a three  and four  day tournament,  respectively,  this 
would correspond to lower total tournament  scores  of 2.4 and 3.2 strokes 
per player.  These  numbers should  be contrasted to the 1.1 stroke 
reduction in total tournament  score  per $100,000 increase in total prize 
money that we observed for exempt players in Table 1. 
Of course, the individuals  who play on the senior  tour are, for the 
most part,  the individuals  who in their  younger years were very successful 22 
on the regular PGA Tour.  If better players  are more responsive  to 
financial incentives,  as some of the results above suggest, and the senior 
tour is comprised disproportionately  of players  who previously  were among 
the better players on the regular  tour,  then  one might expect to observe 
larger responses to financial  incentives  on the senior tour. 
Some evidence supportive  of this explanation  is found in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 7 in which the coefficients  of the winner's prize and 
total  prize money in a tournament  are interacted  with the total  career 
tournament earnings of each player (WPRINT,  TPRINT).  The negative 
coefficients of these interaction  terms suggest that  better players'  ,  as 
measured by higher career  earnings,  effort/concentration  levels are more 
responsive  to financial incentives. 
V.  Conc1udin  emarks 
This paper  has provided nonexperimental  evidence that tournaments 
have incentive  effects.  Our analysis of data from the  1984  Men's PGA Tour 
and the  1984 Senior  Men's PGA Tour suggest that the level and structure of 
prize money does influence  players'  performance.  Higher  prize levels  do 
lead,  ceteris paribus, to lower scores  but this effect occurs primarily in 
the later rounds  of a tournament  when fatigue  has set in and it is more 
difficult for players to maintain  concentration.  Given a player's 
performance  on the first three rounds  of a tournament,  his performance  on 
the last round also appears, ceteris paribus, to depend  on the marginal 
returns to effort he faces,  with players who face larger marginal returns 
scoring lower.  The level of prize  money in tournaments  also influence  who 23 
enter the tournaments,  with higher prize  money attracting  better (exempt) 
players. 
The influence of  tournament prizes  on performance was observed 
primarily  for  exempt players.  As described  in the  text  and the appendix, 
this may reflect either  that  exempt players  are  more  responsive to the 
reward  structure  or that a tournament's  prize level does not adequately 
reflect the reward structure  that rionexempt players  face,  since these 
players must be concerned  with how their  finish  in a tournament  will 
influence their  probability  of qualifying  for exempt  status on next  year's 
tour.  Evidence from the senior tour  provides some support for the former 
hypotheses 
-  -  that better  players are,  in  fact,  more responsive  to 
financial incentives. 
Our work is only an initial empirical  study  of the incentive  effects 
of tournaments  and there are a number  of directions  in which future 
research  might proceed.  First,  replication  using data from other sports 
in which absolute measures of output  are available (e.g.,  bowling) and for 
other years  in which the level and structure  of prizes on the PCA tour 
differed  would obviously  be desirable. 
Second,  all of our analyses are derived form simple two-person  models 
that yield implications  for the output/scores  of an individual  player. 
Generalization to n-person tournaments  would yield implications about  the 
entire distribution  of scores  one might expect  to observe and empirical 
analyses of the distribution of final  scores  could then be undertaken. 
Third,  our analyses assumed that the tournament  prize structure 
influences  output/scores  through its effect  on effort/concentration 
levels.  Players can also choose  conservative  (e.g.. hit down the center 24 
of a fairway) or risky (e.g., try to cut across a dogleg) strategies  and 
depending upon a player's ability  relative to the rest of the field  and/or 
his rank after each round, different  strategies  may be pursued.  Models 
that also included the choice  of strategies  that differ in risk 
undoubtedly  would yield additional  empirical  implications. 
Fourth, there are normative issues relating to the level and 
structure of prizes that  we actually  observe in tournaments.  Can we infer 
from this structure,  what the objective  functions  of the PGA Tour and 
tournament sponsors actually  are?  Can we estimate  whether the marginal 
cost to sponsors of higher prize tournaments  is less than,  equal  to, or 
greater than the marginal benefits they  receive?  To answer  such questions 
will require one to go far beyond  the scores  of players in tournaments  and 
to analyze more generally the operations  of the PCA Tour and its sponsors. 
Finally,  while analyses  of sports  tournaments  are of interest  in 
themselves, there is the broader question  of the extent to which 
tournament theory can help to provide  an explanation  for the structure  of 
mpensation  we observe among  corporate  executives.  Devising  ways to 
address this question should rank  high on the research agenda  of 
economists interested in compensation  issues. 25 
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Footnotes 
1.  See Edward  Lazear (1979,  1983), for a discussion of deferred 
payment schemes; Joseph  Stiglitz (1987), Jeremy Bulow and Lawrence  Summers 
(1986),  Lawrence Katz (1986) and George  Akerloff (1984) for discussions  of 
efficiency  wage theories;  Edward  Lazear (1986)  for a discussion of piece- 
rates,  and Edward Lazear  and Sherwin  Rosen (1981),  Lame  Carmichael 
(1983),  Jerry Green and Nancy Stokey  (1983),  James Malcomson (1984),  Barry 
Nalebuff and Joseph Stiglitz (1984), Mary O'Keefe, W. Kip Viscusi and 
Richard Zeckhauser (1984),  Sherwin  Rosen (1986)  and Kenneth McLaughlin 
(1988) for discussions  of tournament  theory. 
2.  See Ronald Ehrenberg and George  Milkovich (1987),  for a summary 
of what we know empirically  about  how compensation  policy affects 
performance.  Daniel Raff and Lawrence Summers (1987) provide an 
historical attempt at testing efficiency  wage theory.  Attempts to test 
whether piece-rate schemes lead to higher  productivity, for example  John 
Pencavel (1977)  and Eric Seiler (1984),  that involve comparisons  of the 
rnings of piece-rate  and hourly workers run into well-known (including 
by these authors) problems that  workers are not randomly assigned to 
piece-rates in these  studies and that  piece-rate  workers may receive 
compensating wage differentials  for the more variable earnings streams 
they face.  Finally, Andrew  Weiss (1987)  finds  that  within a single  firm, 
the shift from individual  to group incentives  after  workers were employed 
for a specified period led to lower  productivity for the best workers and 
higher  propensities to quit for  workers in both tails of the productivity 
distribution. 
3.  See dive  Bull,  Andrew Schotter  and Keith  Weigett (1987). 29 
4.  In fact the PGA Tour's 1984  Player's  Handbook (1984)  states  that 
"In making a commitment  to play in a PCA Tour cosponsored  or approved 
event, a player obligates  himself to exercise  his maximum golf skill and 
to play in a professional  manner" (p. 58). 
5.  Details are  found  in Michael Bognanno (1988),  Chapter II and the 
appendix. 
6.  See Official 1985 PGA Tour  Media Guide (1984).  Of the 39 
tournaments  actually used in the study (the British Open was excluded for 
reasons that will be made clear  shortly),  9 offered total  prize levels 
between $200,000 and $350,000,  16 had a total  prize level of $400,000,  8 
had a total  prize level  of $500,000,  and 6 offered total  prize money in 
the $565,000 to $800,000 range. 
7.  Official 1985 PGA Tour Media  Guide (1984),  p. 288. 
8.  See 1984 Player's Handbook (1984).  In addition, among other 
things, the system required  members of the tour to play in a minimum 
number of tournaments, to declare their intent  to participate in a 
tournament at least  a week in advance,  to pay a minimal entry fee  ($100) 
per tournament,  and limited  the ability  of players to withdraw from a 
tournament  once a commitment to enter  had been made. 
9.  As we describe below,  our sample  includes  only individuals  in 
categories (i),  (ii),  and (iii). 
10.  We are grateful to Robert  Cibbons and Kevin Lang for stressing 
the need for this appendix. 
11.  The restriction to players  who entered and made the cut leads to 
potential selectivity  problems  and we discuss this issue  below. 30 
12.  As a result,  virtually no individuals  from category iv are 
included in the sample. 
13.  A player's "performance  average" is a measure of how well he 
placed in the tournaments  he entered  during the year,  with high 
performance  averages indicating  better  players.  PAR,  DIST,  SCOREAVE, 
FCUT,  FRACT and MPERAVE  were obtained  from The 1985 Golf Dizest Almanac. 
One paragraph descriptions  of the weather conditions  that players faced 
each day of each tournament  were obtained  from the Official 1985 PGA Tour 
Media Guide;  an average of three  raters'  perceptions  of whether the 
weather each day adversely  affected  player  performance  was then 
constructed.  Finally RATING  was obtained  for a majority of the courses 
from Mr. Jay Matolla of the Metropolitan  Golf Association  and for  the 
other courses through telephone  calls  to state  golf associations. 
Substitution  of the number of players  among the top 20 money winners in 
the year as a measure of field quality  led to estimates that are 
marginally less significant  than those  that follow. 
14.  When a  nonexempt  player  won a tournament,  we changed his status 
to exempt for subsequent  tournaments  in the year. 
15.  The British  Open,  the  fourth  major golf tournament,  was included 
from the analyses  both because RATING  was not available  for it and because 
relatively  few of the top U.S. players enter it.  As a result,  our sample 
actually includes 39 tournaments. 
16.  These data come from the 1984 PCA Tour Player  Record (1985);  a 
complete record  of the performance  of each of the almost 300 players who 
played in at least  one PGA event during  the year. 31 
17.  For brevity these results  are not reported here;  they are 
available from the authors upon request.  The probits included  as 
explanatory  variables, the individual's  exempt  status,  his total  career 
earnings prior to 1984,  his age,  the chronological  order  of the tournament 
during the year (1 to 40)  and its square,  whether the tournament  was a 
major tournament,  the tournament's  total  prize  money, and the player's 
scoring average on all rounds  during the 1984 tour (and/or  in some 
specifications  his scoring average over the first two rounds  of all 
tournaments  during the year).  Each variable  was interacted  with the 
player's exempt status.  The explanatory  variables all were collected  from 
the  1985 PCA Tour Media Guide and the 1985  Golf Digest  Almanac. 
18.  We also estimated specifications  that included a dummy  variable 
for tournaments the week before major tournaments. They suggested  that 
exempt players are less likely,  and nonexempt  players more likely,  to 
enter such tournaments. 
19.  The specific variables  used to obtain the  instruments  are listed 
in the notes to Table 4.  Formal specification  tests conducted  using the 
sample of exempt players permit one  to reject the hypothesis that this set 
of variables should  be treated as exogenous.  See J.A.  Hausman (1978)  for 
these tests. 
20.  The insignificance  of TPRIZE (which  does not vary across 
individuals  in the same tournament)  may be due to its effects being 
captured through  the  instruments  for SCOREI,  SCORE2,  and SCORE3,  or to the 
functional form estimated (TPRIZE and SCR3R.ANK ware entered separately). 
WAVE4 is highly  positively correlated  with VAVE123 and this  may explain 
its negative coefficient. Percent  of Total 
Prize  Money 
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Final  Score  Equations  for  the 1984 Men's PGA Tour: 
Data  Pooled  Acrosa  Tournaments  and Players 
(absolute  value  t atatiatics) 
(1)  (2)  (IE)  (IN) 
CONSTANT  —324.099  (13.1)  —312.030  (12.6)  —334.619  (  9.4)  —281.102  (  8.1) 
TPRIZE  —.011 (  6.9)  —.010  ( 6.1)  —.011  ( 4.9)  —.010  (  3.9) 
TPRIZE5EXMT  —.002  ( 4.4) 
PAR  1.495  (  8.5)  1.470  ( 8.4)  1.637  ( 6.5)  1.152  (  4.7) 
DIST  .006  (  7.4)  .006 ( 7.7)  .004 ( 3.5)  .009  (  7.8) 
RATING  .211 (20.5)  .210 (20.5)  .233 (15.0)  .185  (13.4) 
WAVE  2.394  (13.3)  2.360  (13.1)  2.524  ( 8.7)  2.155  (  9.3) 
MAJ  —.698  (  1.3)  —.654  ( 1.2)  —1.103  (  1.7)  —.811  ( 0.9) 
SCOREAVE  4.059  (14.0)  3.906  (13.5)  3.948  ( 9.6)  3.831  (  9.4) 
FCUT  4.346  ( 3.0)  4.651  ( 3.3)  4.026  (  1.9)  5.114  (  2.6) 
FRACT  4.277  ( 2.1)  3.515  ( 1.7)  9.622  ( 3.2)  —4.064  (  1.3) 
MPERAVE  .042 (10.6)  .045  (11.1)  .039 ( 7.5)  .055 (  8.5) 
2  .421  .426  .436  .410 
n  2432  2432  1030  1401 
where: 
TPRIZE  total  tournament  money  (in 000's) 
EXMT  1—automatically  qualify  to enter  tournaments  on the  1985 men's PGA 
0—not  automatically  qualify 
PAR  par for the tournament  course 
DIST  course yardage 
RATING  course  rating — PGA  evaluation  of the playing  difficulty  of the course 
as it  was set up for the tournament  (expressed  in strokes) 
WAVE  average  of 3  raters'  perceptions  of the number  of days the  weather 
significantly  influenced  player  performance  during  the tournament 
MAJ  1U.S. Open,  PGA,  or  Masters,  Oother 
SCOREAVE  player's  scoring  average  on  all rounds  played  during  the 1984 tour 
FCIJT  fraction  of tournaments  entered  in  which  the player  made the cut on 
the 1984 tour 
FRACT  fraction  of  players  in the tournament  who made the cut that were ranked 
in the top 160 in total  prize  money won during  the  1984 tour 
MPERAVE  mean "performance  average"  on the 1984 tour of players  in the tournament 
who made the cut.  A  player's  "performance  average"  is a  measure  of 
how  high he  placed  in  the tournaments  he entered,  with high  performance 
averages  indicating  better  performance  (see the text for details) Table 2 
Score After  Second Round  Equations  for the  1984 Mens PGA  Tour: 
Data Pooled  Across  Tournaments  and Players 
(absoluce value  t  statistics)a 
(1)  (2)  (18)  (IN) 
CONSTANT  —128.429  (  7.0)  —121.571  (  6.6)  —148.561  ( 5.6)  —93.279  ( 3.6) 
TPRIZE  —.001  ( 0.8)  —.000  (  0.2)  —.001  ( 0.6)  —.000  ( 0.0) 
TPRIZE*ET  —.001 (  3.4) 
PAR  .558 ( 4.4)  .556 ( 4.4)  .759 ( 4.0)  .359 ( 2.1) 
DIST  .000 ( 0.2)  .000 ( 0.3)  —.000  ( 0.8)  .001 ( 1.6) 
RATING  .112  (16.2)  .111  (16.1)  .110  (10.3)  .110  (12.0) 
WAVE2  2.148  (14.7)  2.129  (14.7)  2.106  C 9.2)  2.068  (10.5) 
MAJ  .430  (  1.2)  .462 (  1.3)  .857 ( 1.9)  —.673  (  1.0) 
SCORE12  1.913  (  9.0)  1.820  C 8.5)  2.083  ( 6.9)  1.561  ( 5.1) 
ECUT  —1.855  (  1.7)  —1.825  (  1.6)  —1.001  (  0.6)  —2.751  ( 1.7) 
FRACT2  11.683  C  6.3)  11.088  C 5.9)  10.383  C  3.8)  8.543  ( 2.8) 
MPERAVE2  .008  (  3.0)  .009 ( 3.5)  .008  C  2.5)  .017 C 3.2) 
2  .286  .288  .292  .270 
n  3449  3449  1378  2070 
8A11 variables  are  defined  as in Table  1.  save for WAVE2  which now  refers  to the 
weather  during  the  first  two rounds  of the tournament,  and FRACT2 and  MPERAVE2  which 
now refer  to all entrants  in  the tournament. Table  3 
1984 Men's  PGA Tour Probit  Probability  of Entry Equations 
(absolute  value t statistic.) 
(1)  (2) 
CONSTANT  —9.119  (3.3)  —8.946 (3.2) 
EDT  3435 (0.9)  3.549 (0.9) 
APECASUd  —. 159  (3.3)  —.187 (3.5) 
AAG?  —.471  (0.6)  —.184 (0.3) 
ATCODE5  —.620 (6.3)  —.619 (6.3) 
ATCODE2b  .108  (4.4)  .107  (4.7) 
A34AJ  .329  (2.6)  .327  (2.6) 
AIPRIZ?  .230  (7.9)  .231  (7.9) 
BPRCASUd  .077  (0.7)  .081  (0.7) 
BACEb  —.995 (1.9)  —.978 (1.8) 
ZTCODE5  —.450 (5.30)  —.451 (5.4) 
BTCODE2b  .101  (6.9)  .102  (5.0) 
8MAJ  —.680 (6.9)  —.680 (6.9) 
BTPRIZEC  —.321 (1.4)  —.321 (1.4) 
ASCORE12  .082  (2.0)  —.142 (1.3) 
BSCORE12  .143  (3.7)  .038  (0.3) 
ASCORAVE  .218  (2.3) 
BSCORAVE  .102  (1.0) 
P  —  0  2178  2178 
P  —  1  3516  3516 
x2(DOE)  434.55  (15)  440.91 (17) 
where: 
a  —  coefficient  has been multiplied  by 10 
b  — coefficient  has been  multiplied  by 100 
c — coefficieot  has been multiplied  by 1.000 
d  — coefficient  has been multiplied  by 1,000.000 
An "A" before  a variable  name indicates  the  variable'a coefficient  for  exempt 
players (those  who automatically  qualify  to enter the next  year's  tournaments), 
while a  "B" before  a variable name  indicates  the variable's  coafficient  for 
nonexempt play.rs. 
and 
PRCASB  total career earnings  prior to 1984 
AGE  ags 
TCODE  tournament  code,  in chronological  order,  equals 1 for the first 
tournament  and  40  for the  last 
TCODEZ  TCODE squared 
MAJ  1—U.S.  Opso,  PGA,  or the  Masters,  Oothar 
TPRIZE  total tournament  prime  money (in  000's) 
SCOREAVE  player'. scoring  average on all rounds  played during tha 1984  tour 
SCORZ12  player's  scoring average  on all first  and second rounds  playsd 
during  the 1984 tour Table 4 
Final Round Score Equations for the 1984 Men's PGA Tour: 
Data Pooled Across Tournaments and Playersa 
(absolute  value t  statistics) 
(1A)  (2A)  (3A)  (1E)  (IN) 
CONSTANT  —.996 (0.2)  —5.098 (1.1)  —.929 (0.2)  .409  (0.0)  .259 (0.0) 
SCORE1  .198  (2.4)  .186 (2.2)  .197 (2.3)  .098  (0.6)  .210 (2.1) 
SCORE2  .700 (6.6)  .658 (6.4)  .701 (6.5)  .699 (3.9)  .674 (5.2) 
SCORE)  .122  (1.3)  .246  (3.0)  .121  (1.2)  .198  (1.2)  .126  (1.0) 
WAVEI23  —2.292 (5.0)  —2.040 (4.7)  —2.295 (4.9)  —1.974 (2.7)  —2.304  (4.0) 
WAVE4  —1.155 (1.9)  —1.232 (2.1)  —1.154 (1.9)  —1.692 (1.7)  —.941  (1.2) 
SCR3RANK  .022  (2.5)  .023  (2.5)  .029  (1.8)  .004 (0.3) 
TPRIZE  —.000 (0.7)  .000  (0.0)  .000  (0.2)  .000 (0.2) 
.110  .117  .110  .112  .097 
2390  2390  2390  1018  1371 
where: 
SCOREI  player's first round score in  the tournament 
SCOR.E2  player's second round score in the tournament 
SCORE3  player's third round score in the tournament 
WAVE123  average of 3 raters' perceptions of the number of days the weather 
significantly influenced players' performance during the first three 
days of the tournament 
WAVE4  average of 3 raters' perceptions of whether the weather significantly 
influenced players' performance on the last day of the  tournament 
SCR3RANI(  player's rank after the third round of the tournament 
TPRIZE  total tournament prize money (in 000's) 
and 
A  — all players 
E — exempt  players (players  who have already qualified for next year's  PGA tour) 
N — nonexempt players 
alnstruments for SCORE1, SCORE2, SCORE3,  SCR3RANX were obtained using: 
TPRIZE, MM,  PAR,  DIST,  RATING, FRACT, MPERAVE, FCUT. SCOREAVE (which  are all 
defined in Table 1) and 
SCORE12  — player's scoring  average on all first and second rounds  he played 
on the 1984 tour 
SCORE3A  — player's scoring  average on all third rounds he played on  the 1984 tour 
WAVE1  )  average  of 3 raters' perceptions of whether the weather significantly 
WAVE2  )  influenced player performance during the first, second,  third and 
WAVE3  )  fourth  rounds respectively of the tournament 
WAVE4  ) 
PERAVE  —  player's performance average on  the 1984 PGA tour (see Table  1) Table 5 
Coefficients of  Marginal Return  to Effort Variables in  Final Round 
Score Equations for the 1984 Men's PGA  Tour:  Various Specifications 
(absolute value t statistics) 
Specification  All  Exempt  Nonexempt 
(1)  DPRIZE3  —.042  —.042  —.032 
(2.7)  (1.8)  (0.9) 
(2) IJPRIZE3  —.236  —.310  —.070 
(3.5)  (2.6)  (0.8) 
(3) MIDPRIZ3  —.212  —.278  —  .088 
(3.)  (2.5)  (0.8) 
(4) LES3PRIZ  —.049  —.052  .009 
(2.0)  (1.3)  (0.3) 
(5) LES2PRIZ  —.088  —.135  .025 
(2.6)  (2.4)  (0.5) 
(6) LES1PRIZ  —.181  —.306  .105 
(2.7)  (2.5)  (1.0) 
where: 
DPRIZE3  estimated marginal increase in prize money  (in 000's) if rank 
at the end of  the tournament is one lower than individual's 
third round rank 
UPRIZE3  actual marginal increase in  prize money  (in 000's) if rank 
at  the end of the tournament is one lower than the individual's 
third round rank 
V"PRIZ3  actual average marginal absolute changes in  prize money (in 
000's) if rank at the end of the tournament is one lower or 
one higher  than individual's third round rank 
LES3PRIZ  actual marginal  increase in prize money  (in 000's) if the 
individual Improved his rank after the third round by reducing 
his score by  3 strokes relative to the rest of  the field 
(LES2PRIZ — 2  strokes,  LES1PRIZ  — 1  stroke) 
and 
CAll  specifications  also include SCORE1, SCORE2, SCORE3, WAVE123 and WAVE4 
and use instruments used  for SCORE1, SCORE2, SCORZ3 and the marginal  return 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7 
Average  Score Per Round  on the 1984 Men's  Senior  PGA Tour: 
Data  Pooled  Across  Tournaments  and Players 
(absolute  value  of t statistics) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CONSTANT  10.395  (0.8)  2.961  (  0.2)  18.022  (1.3)  12.796  C  1.0) 
SCOREA  .744 (7.7)  .786  C  8.4)  .630 (5.3)  .644  (  5.7) 
ROUNDS  2.121  (9.8)  2.159 (11.6)  2.147  (9.9)  2.178  (11.7) 
PAR  —.201 (1.3)  —.117  C  0.8)  —.202  (1.3)  —.120 (  0.8) 
DIST  .002 (5.1)  .002 (  4.8)  .003 (5.2)  .002  (  5.0) 
TOP10  .035 (0.5)  .056 (  0.9)  .034  (0.5)  .057 (  0.9) 
WINPRIZ  —.045  (2.7)  —.039  (2.3) 
TPRIZE  —.008 (  6.0)  —.007  (  4.9) 
WPRINTa  —.802  (1.7) 
TPRINTa  —.150 (  2.2) 
2  .347  .396  .350  .403 
n  349  349  349  349 
acoefficient  has been  multiplied  by i08. 
where: 
SCOREA  player's scoring average  on  all rounds played  during  the 
1984 tour 
JTJNDS  number  of rounds in the tournament 
PAR  par for the tournament  course 
DIST  course yardage 
TOP1O  number  of competitors  in  the tournament  who were among  the top 
10  money winners  during  1984 on the seniors'  tour 
WINPRIZ  winner's  prize  (in 000's) 
TPRIZE  total  tournament  prize  money  (in 000's) 
WPRINT  winner's  prize interacted  with the player's  career earnings 
prior  to 1984 
TPRINT  total  tournament  prize  money  interacted  with the player's 
career  earnings  prior  to 1984 Appendix 
Suppose  w1  is the prize for winning and  w2 — my1  is the prize for 
losing  where  is less than one.  Suppose also for exempt players, that 
the relationship between their  output (y) and their  marginal reward for 
winning is given by 
(Al) y —  +  B1(w1-w2) + E — B0  + 81(l-m)w1  + E 
—  +  + E  B1,B2 > 0 
Here all other factors that influence  a player's output are subsumed in B0 
and the response of output to the prize spread is given by B2/(l-m).  If 
the error term  E  is uncorrelated  with  w1,  least squares estimates  of 
(Al)  will yield an unbiased estimate  of  B2  (ignoring any other 
econometric problem). 
Now consider nonexempt players and let  p  represent the probability 
they qualify as exempt players on next year's tour and  w3  their expected 
increase in present value of earnings if they so qualify.  Their marginal 
reward for winning (R) is given  by 
(A2)  R — w1 + p(w1)w3 
-  w2  - p(w2)w3  — (w1-w2) +  w3(p(w1) - p(w2)) 
— (l-o)wl + w3(p(w1) 
-  p(mw1)) 
Assuming that nonexempt players' effort  and output response to the 
marginal reward for winning is the same as that of exempt players 
(A3)  y — B0  + B1R +  E —  B0  + B11(l-m)wi  + w3(p(w1) 
- p(mwi)fl + 
— B0  + B2w1 + 
where 
A-i A-  2 
(A4) *  —  E+ B1(w3(p(w1) 
- p(i))] 
If the error term,  E*,  is positively (negatively)  correlated  with 
w1,  estimation of (A4) by least squares  will yield estimates  of  B2 
(call these  B2) that are biased in a positive (negative)  direction.  The 
correlation of  w1  and  E*,  however,  depends only on the sign of  p'(w1) 
- ap'(w1).  In particular 
(A5) p'(w1) 
- p'(w1)  0 —> E(B2) 
Now consider three possible scenarios for how  p  varies with the 
prize won.  First, suppose  p  increase linearly  with the  individual's 
winnings until the certainty of being classified as exempt next year is 
reached.  In this case,  p'  will be a positive constant, say  c,  and 
(A6) p'(w1) 
- p'(w1) — (l-)c >0 
Hence  B2  will be biased upwards. 
Second, suppose  p'  is increasing  in the size of a prize won in a 
tournament.  In this case, 
(A?) p'(w1) 
- P'('l) > (l-)p'(w1) > 0 
So again  B2  will be biased upwards. 
Finally, suppose  p'  is decreasing in the prize won in a tournament. 
In this case 
p'(v1)  > 
(A8)  p'(w1) 
- p'(v1) 
0  as  _______  ' A-  3 
Hence,  in this last case is it possible that  B2  will be biased 
towards zero. 
Of course,  all of the above assumes that the actual  responses of 
exempt and nonexempt players to the marginal reward  for winning are equal. 
It is possible that exempt players are exempt because their effort levels 
are more responsive  to financial  variables.  Hence, if one observes 
smaller (in absolute  value) values of  B2  for nonexempt  players  (as we in 
fact do in section III), it may reflect either  differences  in true 
response functions  or that  p'(w1) 
- p'(w1) < 0. 